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The Meming of Substantive Due Process
Jamal Greene†

Substantive due process is notoriously regarded as a textual
contradiction, but it is in fact redundant. The word “due” cannot be
honored except by inquiring into the relationship between the nature
and scope of the deprived interest and the process—whether
judicial, administrative, or legislative—that attended the
deprivation. The treatment of substantive due process as an
oxymoron is what this Essay calls a constitutional meme, an idea
that replicates through imitation within the constitutional culture
rather than (necessarily) through logical persuasion. We might even
call the idea a “precedent,” in the nature of other legal propositions
within a common law system. This Essay explores the intellectual
and social history of the substantive-due-process-as-contradiction
meme and argues that it is often appropriate for judges to rely upon
such memes even if their underlying claims lack analytic integrity.
Judicial opinion writing in constitutional cases is best understood
as an act of translation between the decisional process of the judge
and the representations necessary to validate the decision within the
constitutional culture.
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Introduction
Substantive due process is not a contradiction in terms.1 Indeed, it is
redundant. No inquiry into the propriety of some process—its “due”-ness—is or
can be indifferent to the substance of the associated loss. Due process contemplates
a rule of reason that calibrates the relation between, on one hand, the nature and
scope of a deprivation and, on the other, the process that attends it. 2 For some
deprivations, a simple majority vote in the legislature and the signature of the
executive is sufficient process; for others, more, even a constitutional amendment,
may be required. It would beg the question to pronounce, tout court, that any
particular legislative process is always constitutionally adequate. It would turn the
word “due” into surplus.3
It has somehow become common ground across the ideological spectrum
that a textual analysis of this sort fails.4 These days, the most damning charge
against substantive due process is not that it gets the history wrong or that it unduly
empowers judges, both of which might be accurate, but rather that it abuses the
English language, which is not. Part of this Essay’s project, then, is to shift the
terrain on which the battle over the Due Process Clause is waged. Standing alone,
the constitutional text supports substantive due process because the word
substantive, to repeat, is redundant. Part I makes this case. It argues that neither
“substantive” nor “procedural” due process holds superior title to the phrase “due

1

Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980).
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63
(1970).
3
See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 330 (2012) (“A procedure‐only approach to due process cannot
account for the meaning of the word ‘due.’”).
4
See id. at 284 (“[F]or decades it has been a commonplace of law schools that substantive due
process is an oxymoron . . . .”). In addition to Ely, see, e.g., Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512
(7th Cir. 1982) (calling substantive due process “the ubiquitous oxymoron”); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment)
(“The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only “process” before a person is
deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for
even the most casual user of words.”); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 91
(1997) (“Now when you say those words ‘substantive due process’ over and over, you must see . . .
that the phrase is incorrigibly self-contradictory.”); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1071 (1984) (referring to “the awful oxymoron
of substantive due process”); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v.
Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1531 (2008) (“For me as an originalist, the very notion of
substantive due process is an oxymoron.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 897 (2009) (calling
substantive due process a “made-up, atextual invention”).
2
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process of law” or, at the least, that staring at the Constitution contributes nothing
to the argument.5
It would be valuable enough to stop there. For as central as the Due Process
Clause has been to constitutional law over the last century, the inconsistency of
Griswold v. Connecticut6 and its progeny with the constitutional text is no longer
contested.7 As time has passed, the weight of stare decisis has crowded out any
affirmative textual argument in favor of “substantive” due process. The Court itself
said three decades ago in a unanimous opinion that substantive due process is not
suggested by the Constitution’s language and indeed “is nothing more than the
accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”8 This concession tends to stunt the growth of the doctrine and places
supporters of particular constitutional rights—especially to sexual and reproductive
autonomy—unnecessarily on the defensive. It also poses a dilemma for teachers of
constitutional law, who must indoctrinate into students a textual difference between
“substantive” and “procedural” due process that disappears on reflection.
As Part II explains, it was not always thus. Substantive due process was a
phrase seldom used in constitutional law until at least the 1960s, and its prominence
rose dramatically in the 1980s when legal conservatives (and some liberals) began
to lampoon it as a textual anomaly. It was not, as some would have it, a careless
Warren Court innovation, repurposed from the Gilded Age and exposed for its
absurdity after the rise of textualism. In fact, from the dawn of the Fourteenth
Amendment up until the Warren Court, invocations of due process were frequently
what we would now call “substantive” due process, and attacks on the doctrine were
not usually based on the Constitution’s text, which is too vague to contradict much
of anything. The term substantive due process was part of the rhetorical process
that made Lochner v. New York an anticanonical precedent, one that is repeatedly
and (nearly) universally cited as an example of badly misguided constitutional
decisionmaking.9 Lochner’s anticanonicity came about in the 1970s and flourished
in the 1980s as part of the case against sexual privacy and abortion rights.
5

Debates over the conceptual difference between substance and process in the context of due
process of law are of long standing. For a flavor of the various positions, see, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85. Whether or not there is a
conceptual difference, I do believe there is a practical difference, as noted below. See Part I infra.
6
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7
This is true of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment Clauses. As this Essay focuses on the
text rather than the history of the provisions, I use the clauses interchangeably unless noted. For
discussion of potential differences between the two clauses, see Ryan C. Williams, The One and
Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010).
8
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1985) (quoting Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543–44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
9
See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
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Substantive due process was a phrase largely created by its enemies and attributed
to its supporters in a strategic assault on particular Court decisions.
Part III sorts out the implications of this story for the role of analytic
integrity in the formation of constitutional arguments. Whether or not substantive
due process is logically a contradiction in terms, its status as an oxymoron has
become what I call a constitutional meme. A meme is a cultural element—a word,
an idea, a set of assumptions—whose growth and evolution are sometimes said to
mimic genetic transmission.10 A constitutional meme is one passed among and
through generations of lawyers, scholars, and judges as the conventional wisdom
of constitutional law. The wrongness of Lochner, the unamendability of the
Constitution via Article V, the tiers of scrutiny framework, and the textual absurdity
of substantive due process each exemplifies a constitutional meme. Each is an idea,
a cluster of information, so deeply embedded that it is often stated without further
proof or elaboration and resists counterargument.11
Constitutional memes are vital to constitutional law. We can understand
constitutional law as a set of resources for making constitutional arguments. Those
resources fall within a limited number of domains—the text, historical materials,
precedents, prudential arguments, and so forth. Close cases arise when advocates
for divergent positions both have substantial resources to draw upon within these
domains. Constitutional doctrine does not depend on which set of resources
provides correct answers in some metaphysical sense; it depends on who
successfully persuades judges and other legal officials who enjoy decisionmaking
authority. Invoking constitutional memes can help to persuade decisionmakers by
narrowing the ground of argument in ways that are favorable to one’s position.
10

See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
Each of the examples noted in the text is notionally vulnerable to counterargument. Lochner is
consistent with a culture of rights, a concern for minority political representation, and (arguably) the
original understanding of the Due Process Clause. See Greene, supra note 9, at 417–22; see
generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2012). The U.S. Constitution is
infrequently amended in comparison to many in the world, see ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG,
& JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009), but it is far from obvious
whether this textual stability is structurally determined or is instead a dynamic feature of the
prevailing constitutional culture. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional
Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment
Difficulty (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 682, 2014); see also
JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 69–
72 (2013) (arguing that the Article V amendment process has not been too strict to prevent
substantial political change). The descriptive imprecision of the tiers of scrutiny framework is wellknown, see, e.g., James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation
of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2006), even as
departures from the framework continue to form the basis for criticism of the Court’s work. See
Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 67 STAN. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2015).
11
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Judges operate subject to ethical obligations extending beyond the need to
persuade decisionmakers, and that may temper their resort to memes that are
rhetorically useful but false. But the epistemological structure of constitutional law
does not permit constitutional judges to ignore altogether the demands of
persuasion. They must, in effect, translate their decisions into a language
susceptible to validation by the public that constitutional law ultimately serves. The
act of translation can place a judge in the uncomfortable but unavoidable space
between legal fictions and lies.12

I
Substantive due process is often defined but rarely with precision. John Hart
Ely’s quip that substantive due process is a contradiction in terms—“sort of like
‘green pastel redness’”13—is as famous as anything ever said in a constitutional law
monograph, but the ubiquity of the quip should raise suspicion as to its analytic
clarity.14 Ely describes his target as the view that the Due Process Clause
“incorporat[es] a general mandate to review the substantive merits of legislative
and other governmental action.”15 Justice Scalia, the most prominent modern critic
of the doctrine, writes:
By its inescapable terms, [the Due Process Clause] guarantees only process.
Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be taken; even life can be
taken; but not without the process that our traditions require—notably, a
Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF FICTIONS 141 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1932) (“What you
have been doing by fiction—could you, or could you not have done it without the fiction? If not,
your fiction is a wicked lie: if yes, a foolish one. Such is the dilemma. Lawyer! Escape from it if
you can.”).
13
ELY, supra note 1, at 18.
14
Universal or near-universal assent is sometimes said to be a measure of truth. See John Finnis,
Natural Law and the Ethics of Discourse, 43 Am. J. JURIS. 53, 54 (1998) (describing the Platonic
viewpoint). Often this claim assumes not only some form of rational deliberation and reflective
judgment on the part of participants but it also may assume that individuals are more likely than not
to be right. See Hélène Landemore, Collective Wisdom: Old and New, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM:
PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 2 (Hélène Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012). Cf. JAMES
SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW
COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004)).
Unanimity may reflect a lack of textured analysis or incomplete theorization. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). The Talmudic puzzle that
unanimity on the Sanhedrin led to acquittal seems to adopt some version of this reasoning—a
unanimous verdict suggests a troubling lack of independent judgment. See Emphraim Glatt, The
Unanimous Verdict According to the Talmud: Ancient Law Providing Insight Into Modern Legal
Theory, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE 316, 324–25 (2013).
15
Id. at 15.
12
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validly enacted law and a fair trial. To say otherwise is to abandon
textualism, and to render democratically adopted texts mere springboards
for judicial lawmaking.16
In the same vein, Robert Bork insists that the Due Process Clause “is simply a
requirement that the substance of any law be applied to a person through fair
procedures by any tribunal hearing a case [and] says nothing whatever about what
the substance of the law must be.”17 Laurence Tribe writes that the text of the
provision “suggests a guarantee that, whatever the substance of the rules of conduct
government promulgates, those rules may not be brought to bear on any person so
as to deprive that person of life, liberty, or property without fair procedures—such
as a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.”18 Richard Posner has called
substantive due process a “durable oxymoron” whereunder “persons harmed by
state regulation [may] complain that the regulation is so unreasonable a deprivation
of life, liberty, or property that it is unconstitutional even if adopted and applied in
conformity with the most rigorous procedural safeguards.”19
An example may help to diagnose the inadequacy of these formulations as
criticisms of substantive due process. The Court’s recent, controversial expansion
of the Due Process Clause to condemn prohibitions on same-sex marriage supplies
a ready hypothetical. Let us turn back the clock to the day before the Court’s
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.20 Suppose a county registrar refuses to issue a
marriage license solely on the ground that the two people who wish to marry are
both men. In this particular state, the state constitution defines marriage as the union
of a man and a woman. The couple sues, arguing that an agent of the state has
deprived them of liberty without due process of law in violation of the federal
Constitution. According to Ely, Scalia, Bork, Tribe, and Posner—an august,
eclectic bunch—this claim does violence to the text (a charge that would bother
some more than others).
But why? Getting married is a liberty, indeed one previously recognized as
fundamental by the Supreme Court,21 and denial of a marriage license constitutes a
deprivation of that liberty. The denial was effected by a process of law, namely a
16

ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 24–25 (1997).
17
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 31 (1990).
18
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1332-33 (3d ed. 2000).
19
Illinois Psych. Assoc. v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987); accord Ellis v. Hamilton, 669
F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (calling substantive due process “the ubiquitous oxymoron”).
20
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
21
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). But see
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at ____ (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Due Process Clause does
not protect positive liberties).
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state constitutional amendment. And the couple’s claim is that this process is not
the one “due” to them in light of the significance of the deprived interest. A more
rigorous legal process—for example, a federal constitutional ban on same-sex
marriage—would have extinguished the couple’s constitutional claim. A less
rigorous but categorically distinct legal process—a determination by a Supreme
Court majority that the state had sufficient reason to deny the license and that its
denial bore a sufficient relationship to that interest—also would have extinguished
the couple’s claim. As it turns out, the state’s process for effecting its deprivation
of liberty was held to be inadequate—i.e., not due—and hence the availability of
same-sex marriage is now the law of the land.
On this view, substantive due process is not, as Ely would have it, a mandate
to review the “merits” of governmental action but is instead a mandate to determine
which of a long menu of procedural boxes fits a particular kind of state deprivation.
Justice Scalia is right that the text speaks of process, but in adding that “process”
means a “validly enacted law and a fair trial,” he concedes that the clause requires
judges to determine which laws are validly enacted and which trials are fair. These
are substantive questions. Accordingly, Judge Bork cannot mean that the Due
Process Clause requires only that the substance of “any” law be applied through
fair procedures; he would insist, I assume, that the clause further require, as Justice
Scalia implies, that those laws be enacted by constitutionally competent lawmakers.
And who is competent to enact a particular law must depend, in part, on what the
law does. Likewise, Professor Tribe skips a step when he takes “the rules of conduct
government promulgates” as given rather than as the outcome of a process whose
fairness must be matched to the nature and scope of the deprived life, liberty, or
property. Finally, it is simply wrong, pace Judge Posner, to say that a substantive
due process claimant thinks no procedural safeguard would be adequate to justify
the deprivation, since a valid constitutional amendment or a law passed in
satisfaction of strict judicial scrutiny would suffice (even if they are not the relief
the claimant seeks). Put another way, the claim is not that a challenged deprivation
may not occur regardless of the process that attends it; it is that the deprivation may
not occur in light of the process that effected it.
Conceived in this way, it is easy to see how due process may be
conceptualized along a loose (and perhaps overlapping) spectrum from what we
tend to see as its procedural to its substantive elements. This is so because multiple
ambiguities enable a diversity of “processes” to satisfy the textual commands of the
Due Process Clause.22 For a relatively minor deprivation, such as the $23.50 in
hobby materials allegedly lost by Nebraska corrections officials in Parratt v.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 90 (“The language of
the [Due Process Clauses] . . . . could mean just about anything.”).
22
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Taylor,23 due process of law might be no more than the availability of a state tort
system. For a more serious deprivation, such as the loss of life-sustaining but
statutorily defined welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly,24 a pre-deprivation
administrative hearing is “due.” For marginal deprivations of certain fundamental
rights, ordinary, non-arbitrary legislation might be enough,25 but for absolute
deprivations, the Constitution must be amended or the legislation must be subject
to review by an independent adjudicator—a panel of judges—employing certain
standards of necessity and fit.26
The path from procedural to substantive requirements for legislative or
judicial review is not necessarily linear in respect to the severity of the deprivation.
Bert Taylor, Jr. could likely have raised a substantive due process objection had his
$23.50 in hobby materials been deprived intentionally rather than negligently,27 but
John Kelly had no substantive entitlement to intentionally deprived benefits that
had kept him from homelessness.28 Still, the language of “fundamental” rights as
the trigger for substantive due process suggests that strict scrutiny or constitutional
amendment are the bulwarks against deprivations that are categorically more
substantial than the ordinary liberty and property interests that trigger procedural
due process protection.
Claims that substantive due process doctrine describes an approach to a set
of rights whose deprivation is never allowed, no matter the process,29 apply only to
absolute, non-derogable rights.30 It is possible that such rights exist in the American
system—the right against genocide, say31—but the steady assault on substantive
due process does not have these kinds of jus cogens norms in mind.
23

451 U.S. 527 (1981).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (Joint Op.); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978).
26
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Board of Elec., 553 U.S. 181, 434 (2008); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
27
Indeed, though Parratt was decided as a procedural due process case, Richard Fallon has argued
that because Taylor complained that the state lacked adequate reasons for effecting the loss of his
hobby materials, the underlying grievance was better understood in substantive due process terms.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 341–43 (1993); see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 552–53 (Powell,
J., concurring in the result) (noting that the Court’s holding that there had been a deprivation in a
constitutional sense raises the possibility that the state violated substantive due process).
28
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
29
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
30
See Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due
Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 882 (2003). Even this is debatable, since
the word “due” could arguably contemplate that for certain deprivations, no process could justify
them.
31
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(a) & cmt. n.
24
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Two overlapping objections deserve elaboration. First, there is a pleading
issue. A procedural due process claim typically prays for procedural protection to
attach to the complained of deprivation. A substantive due process claim does not
typically pray for a constitutional amendment or for strict judicial scrutiny and no
more. The crux of the complaint is that the deprivation should be voided;
conditional relief giving the jurisdiction the opportunity to amend the Constitution
would be not just procedurally odd but would greatly displease the plaintiff. The
sense in which a claim is substantive rather than procedural in nature pertains to the
relief the plaintiff seeks, not the relief that would eliminate his cause of action. The
plaintiff’s substantive due process complaint directs the court’s energy towards
whether the law is a proper one, which is an unmistakably substantive question,
distinguishable from questions of notice, an opportunity to be heard, the availability
of counsel, and burdens of production and persuasion.
Any claim that substantive and procedural due process do not involve
distinct analysis would need to meet this objection, but that is not this Part’s claim.
The distinction between substantive and procedural due process is intelligible, even
if there is significant ambiguity on the margins. A due process violation requires
that the asserted life, liberty, or property interest pass some threshold of importance
and that it be deprived without crossing some other threshold of regularity or
consistency with the way in which meaningfully similar rights are deprived.
Substantive due process claims focus on the first of these thresholds while
procedural claims focus on the second, and in both cases it is typically assumed that
the other threshold has been crossed. Thus, these argument types are indeed
distinct, and constitutional lawyers, judges, and scholars tend to know them when
they see them. The claim of this Part is simply that the same text—“nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law”—
accommodates both argument types.
A second objection to the analysis in this Part is grounded in the difficulty
in severing textual argument from doctrine and history. The hypothetical
substantive due process claim that opens this Part seems to track the words of the
Due Process Clause and, if successful, vindicates the couple’s substantive interest
in marrying each other. But lawyers, especially those trained in common law
systems, will immediately, indeed instinctively, see a problem with this proposed
reconciliation. Some might argue that neither a constitutional amendment nor
judicial application of strict scrutiny counts as a “process” within the meaning of
the term “due process of law.” The processes the Due Process Clause contemplates
are those such as notice of adverse claims, an opportunity to be heard before a
neutral decisionmaker, with the benefit of counsel and certain evidentiary
protections, and so forth. Perhaps a handful of those lawyers will allow that the Due
Process Clause might be concerned as well with the legislative procedures attending

8

a challenged law, or to the process of judicial review itself. But in that case, the
kinds of infirmities that would make these processes “undue” are not what our
hypothetical has in mind. An “undue” legislative process is one that, say, lacks a
quorum, operates under a non-majoritarian voting rule, or includes unelected
legislators.32 An “undue” judicial review process is one conducted by a biased or
(literally) incompetent judge.33 The notion that the process of ordinary lawmaking
is not “due” because an interest is sufficiently fundamental to require a process of
constitutional amendment, or that the process of rational basis judicial review is not
“due” because the interest at stake requires strict scrutiny, will strike the common
lawyer as casuistic.
Whatever the virtues of this effort to recover a textual argument against
substantive due process, it does not rely on the text, at least not in a way that Ely’s
joke has the resources to describe. For illumination, consider an example borrowed
from Lon Fuller, which he in turn borrowed from John Austin.34 Austin puzzled
over the erstwhile English legal fiction, expounded by Blackstone, that “husband
and wife are one person.”35 Austin writes, “I rather impute such fictions to the sheer
imbecility (or, if you will, to the active and sportive fancies) of their grave and
venerable authors, than to any deliberate design, good or evil.”36 From a narrow
perspective, it would be oxymoronic to say that husband and wife are one person,
no less than to say that two is equal to one.
But as Fuller notes, Austin’s complaint was not really against the use of
language but rather against the claim being made about the legal relation between
husband and wife.37 Even from the internal perspective of English law, husband
and wife were not a unit for all purposes: “When it is said . . . ‘that husband and
wife are one person,’ the meaning merely is, that they lie under certain incapacities
with respect to one another. And where those incapacities do not intervene, the
fiction of their unity ceases, and they are deemed twain.”38 Calling the phrase
32

See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEBRASKA L. REV. 197, 240 (1976).
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that due process of law requires
judicial recusal where significant judicial election contributions by a litigant to a judge in his or her
case create an appearance of bias); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (permitting
administrative adjudication of private rights so long as final adjudication was available in Article
III courts); Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State
Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism,
56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2014) (arguing that judicial elections violate the Due Process Clause).
34
See L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 387 (1930).
35
2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 630
(1873); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769)
442–45.
36
AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 631.
37
See Fuller, supra note 34, at 387.
38
AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 630.
33
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“imbecilic” draws rhetorical leverage from the absurdity of the language, taken
narrowly, but Austin’s disagreement with Blackstone is, in the end, a legal dispute,
and a pedantic one at that. Fuller likens “husband and wife are one” to the statement,
“A has a legal right against B to payment of $100.”39 Knowing that A has a legal
right does not, without more, tell us “whether A may forcibly take $100 from B’s
pocket, nor whether A may have B jailed if B refuses to pay the $100. For the
particulars, [we] must go elsewhere.”40
Likewise, to understand why substantive due process sounds oxymoronic
requires more than a knowledge of the English language. For the particulars, we
must tap into a certain, and notably incomplete, legal tradition. Abstracted from any
such tradition at a particular point in time, “due process of law” is a meaningless
string of words.41 It acquires meaning as a legal term through its use in the law. The
strongest version of this point would draw on the hermeneutic tradition and observe
that all language is culturally and temporally situated, such that no phrase whose
meaning is understood by its speakers or listeners could possibly be a nonsensical
juxtaposition of opposites. “Jumbo shrimp” evokes RED LOBSTER®, not confusion.
Indeed, we might better define an oxymoron not as a contradiction-in-terms but
instead as a paradox, a superficial internal tension that abates on reflection.42
Substantive due process is just such a paradox, and so calling it an oxymoron
reflects rather than undermines its inherent consistency.
But we need not take a detour into the philosophy of language to understand
that “due process of law” has meant different things to different actors at different
points in the history of American law. No less an authority than Antonin Scalia
provided a guided tour of those meanings in his concurring opinion in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip.43 The Haslip Court rejected a substantive due
process claim by an insurance company complaining about the size of a punitive
damages award. Justice Scalia agreed with the judgment but would have held that
any procedurally sound punitive damages award that did not violate the Bill of
Rights satisfied the Due Process Clause.44 In so arguing, he offered a standard
account of the origins of the due process language in the U.S. Constitution.
The clause seems first to have appeared in a 1354 English statute: “No man
of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken
nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer
39
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Id.
41
See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 90.
42
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by due process of the law.”45 Despite conflicting historical evidence,46 the English
jurist Sir Edward Coke thought the term was identical to the phrase “Law of the
Land” (per legem terrae) as used in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta: “No Freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free
Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not
pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the
Law of the Land.”47 The “law of the land” meant the customary adjudicative
procedures under the English common law.48
American colonists, familiar with Coke, incorporated “law of the land”
language into eighteenth century state constitutions, and the same basic meaning—
according to customary English procedures—survived as the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.49 In Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co.,50 decided in 1856, the Court affirmed Coke’s translation
but also noted that the provision constrained “the legislature as well as . . . the
executive and judicial powers of the government.”51
The Court’s first significant elaboration of the meaning of the clause
subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment came in Hurtado v.
California, an 1884 decision in which a convicted murderer argued, unsuccessfully,
that due process of law required a grand-jury indictment.52 Justice Scalia’s Haslip
concurrence takes from Hurtado that historical practice is sufficient but not
necessary to qualify as due process of law.53 A procedure not blessed by history
would be invalid if it failed to comport with “those fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”54 Justice
Scalia’s opinion notes that by 1934, when the Court decided Snyder v.
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Massachusetts,55 consistency with the principles of “fundamental justice” seemed
to have become a necessary condition of all procedures to satisfy the Constitution.56
Although historical practice carried great and perhaps dispositive weight
according to the Snyder Court, Justice Scalia writes that incorporation of the Bill of
Rights against the states caused cleavage between historical practice and what the
Bill of Rights required.57 The Court came to the view that its own interpretations of
the Bill of Rights, developed in the context of exclusive application to the federal
government, also set a lower bound for what qualified as fundamental fairness. This
conflation meant that states that violated the Bill of Rights as previously defined by
the Court automatically violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.58 Over time, and unsurprisingly, the Court began to understand the
Due Process Clause to prohibit any practice that failed a test of “fundamental
fairness,” no matter its historical pedigree and no matter its relationship to the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.59 In Haslip, decided a quarter century ago,
Justice Scalia’s opinion traces this analysis to “due process opinions in recent
decades.”60
Justice Scalia’s tour of the history of the Due Process Clause effectively
makes the point that substantive due process is not a contradiction in terms. Due
process of law is meaningless in the abstract, extracted from its historical situation.
It once seems to have meant “according to ‘specific writs employed in the English
courts.’”61 Later, it meant “according to the law of the land,” a phrase that itself
seemed to refer to customary English procedure. Later, it meant “according to
traditional practice” or “according to the tenets of fundamental justice.” Later, and
for at least the past several decades, it has meant “according to principles of
fundamental fairness,” a concededly substantive standard.
And there is more. At least two other definitions of due process of law
emerged during the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century and thus
can be assumed to have influenced the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 On
one view, due process of law would be violated by a law that defeated vested
property rights by denying compensation after a taking or by transferring property
55
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from one private person to another.63 On another related but broader view, due
process of law required that laws be appropriately general and prospective rather
than class-based, retrospective, or arbitrary.64 On either view, the Due Process
Clause binds the legislature and extends beyond mere procedural regularity. Note
as well that just about everyone agrees that the American usage of “due process of
law” is synonymous with “by the law of the land,” a phrase that, though likely a
reference to procedures, does not explicitly refer to process.65 Was per legem terrae
also a contradiction in terms? Or is it rather that the text is not literal and therefore
not susceptible to denotation as an oxymoron in any but a trivial sense?66
Justice Scalia has exhaustively worked out a theory that tells us which of
the many definitions of due process of law is the one judges in constitutional cases
should adopt.67 But to say that the traditional understanding of a legal term (much
less one traditional understanding among others) just is its current textual meaning
confuses a theory of language with a theory of interpretation.68 And so, as we might
have suspected all along, the claim that substantive due process is a contradiction
in terms is really just a volley in the eternal debates over constitutional
interpretation. Those debates are deeply contested and it really is very helpful for
one side to be able to say, credibly on the surface, that the other side’s position
disobeys the rules of English. Revealing the sparseness of the textual argument
against substantive due process unstacks the deck.
II
As noted, inconsistency with the text is hardly the sole objection to
substantive due process. One could reject substantive due process for at least as
many reasons as there are forms of orthodox constitutional argument. One could
argue that it is inconsistent with the intentions or understandings of the framers of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments; that it resurrects repudiated precedents such
as Lochner or Dred Scott; that it requires substantive value judgments in a
63
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Constitution that prizes judicial regulation through procedure; or that it encourages
judges to engage in policymaking at the expense of democracy. We have heard all
of these complaints before. It would be surprising if no one before Ely thought to
supplement these arguments with the simple observation that substantive due
process is a nonsense phrase that makes hash of the text, but that isn’t far from the
truth. The phrase “substantive due process” has been in legal circulation since at
least the 1920s,69 but it is surprisingly difficult to find criticisms of either the term
itself or its underlying concept that are framed in textual terms prior to the 1980s.
In fact, I am aware of only three authors to have referred to substantive due
process as either an oxymoron or a contradiction in terms before Ely did so in
1980.70 The earliest such reference appears in a 1956 Canadian law review article
by W.F. Bowker, who was then the dean of the law school at the University of
Alberta.71 Bowker was comparing property rights in Canada and the United States
and noted that although the due process clause seemed to place no substantive
limitations on legislation affecting property rights, it had been interpreted
otherwise. “Thus,” Bowker wrote, “grew the concept of ‘substantive due process,’
a contradiction in terms to be sure, but one that for about a half a century ending
just before World War II operated to impose severe restrictions on economic
legislation.”72
The second reference comes in historian Leonard Levy’s introduction to
Robert McCloskey’s classic defense of economic due process that appears in an
edited volume of essays on the U.S. Constitution.73 Levy criticizes McCloskey for
failing to acknowledge that substantive due process “was always a judicially
contrived, oxymoronic concept that distorted history, logic, and plain meaning.”74
The certitude of Levy’s skepticism here is mysterious. Levy has in other writing
conceded that a version of substantive due process is historically available (if
inconclusive), and moreover that the Due Process Clause is “written in language
that blocks fixed meanings.”75
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Finally, Hermine Herta Meyer, a Justice Department lawyer, referred to
substantive due process as “self-contradictory,” “a contradiction in terms,” and “an
invention of American judges” in a 1972 law review article defending the pretrial
detention procedures of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970.76 Meyer’s article appears to have been part of a coordinated
effort by members of the Nixon Justice Department to influence how courts would
treat legislative bail reform.77 Meyer later called substantive due process a
“nonsense phrase” in her 1977 book on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
published by the vanity publisher Vantage Press.78
It is perilous to draw conclusions from this small (and likely underinclusive)
sample of pre-1980s references to the internally contradictory character of
substantive due process, but it is difficult not to notice that none of the three was a
lawyer raised in the United States. Bowker was a Canadian lawyer, Levy a
nonlawyer born in Canada, and Meyer a German lawyer who immigrated to the
United States as an adult. This coincidence suggests (if dimly) the possibility that
a superficially available textual argument against substantive due process was
nonetheless foreign to the American legal culture.79 The canonical critique was
located outside the text.
The origin of substantive due process is sometimes traced to Chief Justice
Taney’s lead opinion in Dred Scott.80 This accusation (le mot juste) is better rhetoric
than it is legal history,81 but its accuracy is not presently important. It is enough to
say that the opinion may plausibly be read as holding that a law prohibiting slavery
in federal territories violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because
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it deprives slaveholders of vested property rights in their slaves.82 The dissenters,
Justice McLean and Justice Curtis, disputed this holding on the merits but neither
of them questioned the applicability of the Due Process Clause as a substantive
limitation on legislative activity.
Likewise, in Lochner v. New York, the chief error of which has frequently
been described as its resort to substantive due process, 83 neither of the two
dissenting opinions suggested that the Due Process Clause is or should be
concerned only with adjudicative procedures.84 Justice Harlan explicitly endorsed
substantive due process85 but found the Bakeshop Act reasonable.86 Justice Holmes
counseled legislative deference—what we today would call rational basis review—
but his opinion nonetheless rests on the view that the Due Process Clause requires
judges to inquire into “fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law.”87 Holmes betrayed no textual or other
principled objection to substantive due process: “General propositions do not
decide concrete cases.”88
There is some evidence that Louis Brandeis, the other great dissenter of the
Lochner era, believed, as a matter of principle, that the Due Process Clause should
be limited to procedural irregularities. Felix Frankfurter noted as much in
transcribing a 1923 conversation with Brandeis in which the latter is reported to
have said further that, so long as due process is recognized as having a substantive
component, it must be applied to those rights that are truly fundamental such as
speech and education.89 Brandeis’s contingent adoption of substantive due process
reflects his position in Meyer v. Nebraska90 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters91—both
60 U.S. 393, 450 (1957). The “substantive due process” holding, which does not use the precise
term, is notoriously opaque. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE
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education cases in which Brandeis joined the majority’s substantive due process
holding—and in Gilbert v. Minnesota,92 in which he dissented from the Court’s
opinion upholding a Minnesota anti-sedition law. After recounting the Court’s
series of substantive due process holdings in the economic realm, Brandies wrote
in Gilbert, “I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.”93
Justice Brandeis’s reluctant acceptance of substantive due process is also of
course reflected in his famous concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.94
“Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive,” he wrote,
“it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.”95 I am not aware of
any writings in which Brandeis specified what, precisely, those persuasive
arguments comprised. This point is significant in itself. Brandeis’s approach to law
was intensely fact-specific, not given to pronouncements of what legal provisions
mean in a metaphysical sense. It was appropriate to his life as an advocate that the
meaning of the Due Process Clause could be settled through legal argumentation
and precedent and not thereafter revisited ex tabula rasa. Moreover, as his Gilbert
dissent reflects, Justice Brandeis’s views on the Due Process Clause are inseparable
from his views on the property rights with which the clause had always been
associated in its substantive form.
His disciple Frankfurter likewise agreed with Brandeis about the procedural
connotations of substantive due process96 but likewise seemed motivated less by
any philosophical objection than by distaste for the results he observed. Like
Brandeis, Frankfurter supported the Court’s decisions in Meyer and Pierce, but he
thought that liberty-protecting decisions such as those could not justify the cost of
property-protecting decisions like Lochner and Coppage v. Kansas.97 As a judge,
Frankfurter gave no hint of dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause
forbids certain significant rights deprivations.98 He joined several opinions in which
the Court overturned (or the joined dissent would have overturned) non-procedural
92
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state laws as violations of due process;99 concurring in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
overturning a state-level subversive activities prosecution, Justice Frankfurter
wrote that striking a balance between a citizen’s right to political privacy and the
State’s right to self-protection “is the inescapable judicial task in giving substantive
content, legally enforced, to the Due Process Clause.”100 To be sure, Frankfurter,
like Holmes, believed deeply in legislative deference. 101 But that did not mean the
Court should stay altogether out of the business of ensuring that, as Justice Jackson
wrote, joined by Frankfurter, “reasonable general legislation [is] reasonably applied
to the individual.”102
To recap, none of the great opponents of substantive due process prior to
the 1960s opposed it on textual grounds. As discussed below, that omission results
in part from an intellectual temperament within the constitutional culture that was
less literalist and, relatedly, less worshipful of the constitutional text and its
authors.103
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Figure 1

Discussion of substantive due process among constitutional lawyers and
commentators grew dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 1 reproduces an
Ngram of references to “substantive due process” in English-language books
digitally catalogued by Google Books from 1920 to 2008.104 The Ngram illustrates
a sharp upward trend with an inflection point at 1965, the year in which the Supreme
Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut105 and four years after the Court decided
Griswold’s predecessor case, Poe v. Ullman.106 Griswold, which overturned a
Connecticut ban on contraceptive use, drew plenty of fire, including from the
dissenting opinions of Justice Black and Justice Stewart. But neither opinion argues
that the Due Process Clause applies only to “process.” Justice Black opposed
104

Google
books
Ngram
Viewer,
available
at
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=substantive+due+process&year_start=1920&yea
r_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Csubstantive%20due%20p
rocess%3B%2Cc0 (search run Aug. 9, 2015). The table has a smoothing of 3, which means that
each year represents an average of that year’s value and the values of the three years before and
after. Also, the values are reported as a percentage of the complete catalog for any given year, which
makes it unlikely that the trend is driven by changes in the denominator rather than the numerator.
It is difficult to say this with certainty, however, since we do not know how the proportion of books
in the dataset relating to constitutional law varies over time.
105
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106
367 U.S. 497 (1961).

19

Griswold and other substantive due process holdings on the ground that they
protected rights that were not explicit in the constitutional text and therefore granted
an inappropriate amount of discretion to judges.107 Justice Stewart joined Justice
Black’s opinion and opposed the decision on similar democratic process
grounds.108
The structure of Justice Douglas’s majority opinion likely influenced the
locus of criticism. Justice Douglas did not follow Lochner in arguing that the Due
Process Clause, of its own force, authorizes judges to inquire into the substantive
reasonableness of state laws. Rather, he argued that the Connecticut anticontraceptive law touched on interests implicated in a constitutional right to privacy
that, as a positive matter, could be located within the interstices of the text of the
Bill of Rights.109 This approach proved an easy target. Representing the right to
privacy as a “penumbra” or “emanation” from the Constitution seemed a reach to
many, one that exposed a deficit in serious arguments in favor of such rights.
Grounding the interests Douglas sought to protect more directly in the Due Process
Clause—as the opinions of Justice Goldberg, Justice Harlan, and Justice White all
sought to do in different ways110—was more open to criticism based on Lochnerism
but was, by comparison, a more textualist approach.
Consistent with that observation, the dominant criticisms of substantive due
process in the decade following Griswold tended to be prudential rather than
textual. Thus, Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland rejected a constitutional right
to privacy or otherwise objected to Griswold or Roe on the merits.111 Both believed
in incorporation via the Due Process Clause. Neither appeared to view the text as
compelling a procedural focus. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Roe also did not
object to substantive due process tout court.112 Indeed, he argued that an abortion
restriction without an exception for procedures thought necessary to save the
pregnant woman’s life would violate the Due Process Clause.113 Even Robert Bork
lodged no textual objection to the word “process.” Bork believed that any
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510–21 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black’s belief in total
incorporation, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (Black, J., dissenting), would have
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108
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constitutional rights not specifically enumerated in the text requires judges to make
impermissible value judgments, and so substantive due process was an invitation
to activism rather than (necessarily) a perversion of the text.114 Indeed, Bork would
sacrifice the text to judicial restraint.
Textual arguments against the due process clause gained currency in the
1980s, following Ely’s book. Since then, literally hundreds of authors, including
several judges in the course of opinions, have called substantive due process
oxymoronic or contradictory, and a fair number have cited Ely for that
proposition.115 Notably, the first state or federal judge to have called substantive
due process an oxymoron in a published opinion appears to have been Posner, who
did so in a 1982 case in which (apparently without irony) he called the doctrine
simultaneously “exotic” and “ubiquitous.”116 Judge Posner has referred to the
phrase as oxymoronic several times since.117
This trend surely says less about substantive due process, which meant
about the same (if not less, substantively) in the 1980s as it did before, than it says
about prevailing practices of constitutional argumentation. The more or less sudden
realization that “substantive” contradicts “process” in the Due Process Clause—
and that this is a fatal defect—coincides with the rise of a certain kind of
originalism. That rise was not organic but rather was deliberately orchestrated by
conservative activists both inside and outside of the Reagan Justice Department.118
114
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Indeed, a substantial number of the judicial opinions to have made textual criticisms
of substantive due process—and the great majority of the appellate opinions—were
written by appointees of that department.119 Two of those appellate judges, Danny
Boggs of the Sixth Circuit and Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, worked
under Bork in the Office of the Solicitor General in the 1970s.
Originalism does not, per se, support the view that substantive due process
is contradictory. As noted, whether the framers of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments meant to endow the Due Process Clause with substantive content is a
contested question, and the phrase “due process of law” has long been thought
synonymous with “according to the law of the land,” which is not inherently
procedural. The 1980s turn against the words instead reflects a particularly literal,
acontextual, and politically opportunistic (if sincere) approach to historical
argument: in the spirit of oxymorons, call it anachronistic originalism.
Words in legal documents are not just their counterparts in ordinary speech.
They are meant to be understood by their handlers—lawyers, usually—who operate
under certain professional assumptions that may diverge from common speech
conventions. This is not to say that legal documents, and especially constitutions,
are not meant to be understood by non-lawyers; it is to say, rather, that even
constitutions are not meant to be misunderstood by lawyers. It is telling that Justice
Black, perhaps the most committed textualist in the Court’s history, did not believe
the text of the Due Process Clause had a facially obvious meaning: “Some might
think that the words themselves are vague,” he wrote in his dissenting opinion in In
re Winship,120 “[b]ut any possible ambiguity disappears when the phrase is viewed
in the light of history and the accepted meaning of those words prior to and at the
time our Constitution was written.”121 The belief that “substantive” and “process”
are necessarily, indeed risibly, in conflict transposes a modern, common-sense view
of the meaning of English words onto words in eighteenth and nineteenth-century
legal documents.
For a non-originalist and a pragmatist like Posner,122 there is nothing
untoward about this move. He does not, after all, reject substantive due process; he
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just thinks it sounds silly, and he’s right. For others, conflating the common sense
meaning of today with the legal meaning of yesterday can go some way towards
affecting the legal meaning of today. “It is not that ‘substantive’ due process is
linguistically self-contradictory,” Henry Monaghan wrote in 1981. “It is not any
longer, if one accepts the teachings of ordinary language philosophy that ‘meaning
is use.’ The core problem is one of constitutional theory, not of language.”123 But
adopting and promoting a constitutional theory that relies on language means that
changing language meaning—as through “use”—serves one’s theory. Through
sufficient repetition within the appropriate language community, the view that
substantive due process is an oxymoron can become a self-fulfilling prophesy. If it
was not an oxymoron in 1981, it is now—or so that was the goal.
But there is more to it than this. Although the phrase substantive due process
has been around for nearly a century, the category of claims it describes was more
often simply called “due process” for much of that time. As substantive due process
became more frequently invoked as a distinct constitutional claim, procedural due
process—which seems redundant—also was invoked more often. Using two
different words for something—making it some things—has cognitive in addition
to linguistic consequences. Experiments in linguistics have demonstrated that the
categories that exist within a particular language community influence participants’
perception of phenomena in the world. For example, native Spanish speakers tend
strongly to associate objects with the genders grammatically assigned to them
within the Spanish language, even if those assignments are arbitrary. 124 Thus,
consistent with patterns across languages, a native English speaker is likely to code
natural objects as feminine and artificial objects as masculine; for Spanish speakers,
this tendency is often overridden by the grammatical categories of Spanish.125
A soft form of linguistic relativity seems likely to influence judgments made
within the language community of constitutional lawyers. Substantive due process
peels away from procedural due process not just because of any underlying
conceptual or semantic difference but also because they carry different labels. And
as between these labels, procedural due process surely seems more “about”
“process,” and therefore to have more conceptual integrity. Thus, the phrase
“substantive due process” helps to generate the very textual anomaly that it is said
to describe.
III
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Substantive due process may not be a contradiction in terms, but it sounds
like one. Comparing it to green pastel redness is funny, if a bit esoteric. Three of
the most significant American legal figures of the last half century, representing
wildly different jurisprudential and political ideologies—Ely, Posner, and Scalia—
have called substantive due process an oxymoron in prominent writings. Is that
enough to make it one? Should it be enough?
A comparative example helps to sharpen the question. Discussions of
linguistic relativity migrated into the culture long ago in the form of the old saw
that there are x number of “Eskimo” words for snow. The observation is meant to
show that language and perception are deeply interrelated. Linguist Laura Martin
has described the observation itself, however, as a kind of folklore.126 It seems first
to have originated in a 1911 article by the anthropologist Franz Boas, who
mentioned four different Eskimo words for “snow” in an article about the difficulty
in comparing language structures.127 Benjamin Whorf, a linguist, later popularized
the example, mentioning five words for “snow,” though without naming any
specific sources or data.128 Two important 1950s anthropological textbooks whose
authors were influenced by Whorf mention the example. Martin says that one or
both of those books “were probably read by most anthropologists trained between
1960 and 1970, and by countless other students as well during that heyday of
anthropology’s popularity.”129 By 1986, Martin was able to say that “[t]extbook
references to the example have reached such proliferation that no complete
inventory seems possible,”130 and that the example had deeply infiltrated pop
culture: it appeared in a Lanford Wilson play,131 a trivia encyclopedia,132 a New
York Times editorial,133 and on a local weather forecast. By the time it reached this
last source, Boas’s four words had become “two hundred.”134
The “Eskimo words for snow” tale is a meme, “an idea that becomes
commonly shared through social transmission.”135 There is disagreement within the
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memetics literature as to what more one can say about memes and the degree to
which they possess the properties of evolving organisms or map onto existing social
scientific understandings of diffusion of practices, beliefs, and other cultural
artifacts.136 A technical definition is unnecessary to the basic, suggestive insight.
The motivating ideas behind memes are that they are social—reproduction through
human networks is an existential condition—and that they tend to replicate through
imitation or absorption rather than through reflection.137 The jurisprudentially
inclined will recognize this feature of meme transmission as “contentindependence,” a quality that also attaches to the authority of common law judicial
precedents.138
Memes are ubiquitous in American constitutional law. Indeed, the common
law system encourages the transmission of legal information through shared
understandings replicated by processes of imitation that risk mutating the original
source.139 That imitation may be simple, as in a typical string cite, or it may be
complex, as in the practice of referring to anticanonical cases to express
methodological or substantive disagreement with an interlocutor. For example,
citations to Lochner or to Dred Scott are not precedent-based in the usual sense but
are better characterized as forms of ethical argument.140 Ethical argument draws
upon the American self-conception as a source of interpretive authority.141
Invocation of anticanonical cases is intended as a conversation-stopper, and the
capacity of these cases to serve this function endows them with value beyond
whatever underlying analogical power they may contribute.
Much of what goes under the heading of blackletter constitutional law also
has a memetic character. Owing to its complex relationship to politics and the
magnitude of the (often capricious) Supreme Court’s role within it, constitutional
law has a contingent character that resists hornbook formulations. For example, it
136
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is common teaching that legislative abridgements of fundamental rights are
reviewed under strict scrutiny, and yet it is remarkably difficult to find cases in
which the Court has applied that standard. This is because, consistent with the thrust
of this Essay, the Court in practice grades the reviewing standard by the gravity of
the abridgement even as it rarely acknowledges a general practice of doing so.142
Karl Llewelyn long ago recognized interpretive canons as having a similarly
memetic structure: “to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the canon
must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon.”143 Canons are
rhetorical resources, and Llewelyn’s memorable observation that each canon-based
claim confronts an equally canonical counterclaim means to demonstrate,
whimsically, that their proliferation is content-independent.144
Richard Primus has identified a related phenomenon as a “continuity
tender,” which he defines as “an inherited ritual formula that one repeats to affirm
a connection to one’s predecessors, not to endorse the content of that statement as
one’s predecessors originally understood it.”145 For Primus, a continuity tender is a
kind of rote incantation that serves a symbolic link to the past, on the order of Royal
Assent to statutes passed by the British parliament.146 “Be it enacted by the Queen’s
Most Excellent Majesty . . . .” serves the same community-building purpose that
other rituals serve, but it has no practical significance.147 Primus’s motivating U.S.
constitutional example is the notion that the federal government is a government of
enumerated powers. Courts recite this principle in constitutional cases in order to
emphasize a core ethical commitment of American constitutionalism,148 but in
practice Congress has come to have a general police power.149
All continuity tenders are memes but not all memes are continuity tenders.
Repetition of a constitutional meme need not serve the purpose of symbolic
continuity with the past. It might alternatively serve as a kind of cognitive shortcut,
or heuristic.150 Constitutional decisionmaking can be difficult. The resources for
142
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resolving such cases—typically identified as text, history, structure, precedent, and
consequences—can be mutually inconsistent, and there is no consensus on how (or
whether) to assign weights among them.151 Cognitive heuristics can place the
interpreter into a frame of mind that streamlines decisionmaking, and particular
memes can be vehicles for these heuristics.
Consider two heuristics that are pervasive within legal argument: the affect
and expertise heuristics. The affect heuristic involves reliance on whether a
potential risk is emotionally coded as “good” or “bad.”152 This heuristic is critical
to System 1, or experiential, thinking, which “encodes reality in images, metaphors,
and narratives to which affective feelings have become attached.”153 The expertise
heuristic involves reliance on expert validation as a quick-and-ready measure of the
accuracy of a particular judgment.154 Legal arguments, including those offered by
constitutional judges, make frequent use both of appeals to emotion (including
through humor) and of appeals to authority.155 Appeals of those sorts align
constitutional argument with other modes of practical discourse, as they
correspond, respectively, with the pathetic and ethical modes of persuasion first
identified by Aristotle.156
The association of the substantive-due-process-as-oxymoron meme with a
joke by Ely, and subsequently with the views of other leading figures in
constitutional law, enables legal audiences—including judges, lawyers, and
nonlawyers—to process its underlying content using heuristics. This is not to say
that the presence of the meme disables systematic processing—both systematic and
heuristic processing can occur in relation to the same proposition—nor is it to say
that commentators must be wrong that substantive due process is an oxymoron.
One could disagree with the analysis in Part I and it would still be the case that the
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ways in which the substantive-due-process-as-oxymoron meme is typically
communicated make its truth or falsity less relevant to its capacity to persuade. As
Michael Fried writes, “Memes, like genes, will succeed if they are good replicators,
whether or not they are correct or good for their human carriers.”157
There is reason, though, for constitutional lawyers to be less bothered by
this possibility than linguists are bothered by apocryphal claims about Eskimo
words. Martin’s article on the words-for-snow meme provoked a vigorous scholarly
debate over the accuracy of the underlying proposition.158 Whether the different
descriptors for snow in various dialects of Eskimo and Inuit languages are really
compound words atop a small and uninteresting set of roots or whether the dozens
of words for snow and snow-related phenomena are each lexically distinct and
worthy of study is of great importance to linguists and anthropologists who focus
on indigenous languages.159 Notably for our purposes, the fact that local
weathermen appear to believe that there are 200 Eskimo words for snow (within a
given dialect, the laugh line assumes) is of no moment to the serious debate among
language professionals. They are simply different discourses, between which any
influence, such as it may be, is unidirectional, from the Benjamin Whorfs of the
world down to the Brick Tamlands.
Constitutional law obeys a different epistemology. It is primarily the
product of a “constitutional culture” of nonjudicial actors whose values and beliefs
it incorporates.160 This observation is nearly axiomatic among political scientists,
and it is broadly shared by constitutional lawyers as well.161 Constitutional law
takes its cues from—sits in dialogue with—legal understandings embedded within
the broader culture, and relies on that culture for validation. Standard accounts of
court decisionmaking understand certain prudential mechanisms from the
perspective of the need for the law, as Neil Siegel writes, “to account for the
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conditions of its own legitimation.”162 As Robert Post notes, “the Court must find
a way to articulate constitutional law that the nation can accept as its own.”163
The upshot of this perspective is that, in constitutional law, persuasion
carries independent normative weight. The value of persuasion in constitutional law
is not merely instrumental or practical, as it is in other domains, but is also semantic.
Constitutional law that fails to evolve with and seek affirmation from the people it
governs not only fails descriptively, when it comes to the U.S. Constitution, but is
also tyrannical.164 And so it counts against a constitutional proposition that the
proposition is not persuasive.165 To the extent there is tension between what is
persuasive and what is “correct,” it may not always be normatively appropriate for
a constitutional decisionmaker to be guided by the latter. Validation from the
constitutional community is a lot (if not all) of what matters to the legitimacy of
constitutional law. That validation happens iteratively, as judicial actors seek both
to “reflect and regulate constitutional culture,”166 but its indefinite absence is the
death of a constitutional claim.
Which returns us to the question with which this Part began: how much
should we be bothered that actors throughout the constitutional culture believe that
substantive due process is an oxymoron if the belief lacks logical foundation? The
answer to this question depends on who the actors are. Academics should of course
interrogate the conventional wisdom of their subjects, and so constitutional law
scholars and teachers should either adopt or explicitly reject a critique along the
lines of Part I. Most legal advocates arguing either in favor of or against a
substantive due process claim should assume whatever posture is most helpful to
their overall legal position. The underlying analytic integrity of that position is not
independently relevant, though certain repeat players such as the Solicitor General
may moderate their advocacy in the immediate case for reputational or institutional
reasons. Although the role morality of lawyers is not without complexity,167 it is
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clear that legal advocates need not subjectively believe in the arguments they
advance on clients’ behalf.168
The more difficult question is whether different obligations attach to judges
or other constitutional decisionmakers. The possibility that memes distort the
analytic integrity of constitutional law surfaces at least two potential problems for
adjudicators, whom we will call judges for expository purposes. First, judges might
be persuaded to make decisions that they would not make had they the time and
inclination to interrogate the meme. Second, judges might themselves make use of
memes to persuade their audiences to adopt the judges’ ultimate conclusions.
The first problem implicates the integrity of constitutional decisionmaking
and the second the integrity of constitutional acceptance. Using a constitutional
meme to persuade a judge as to a legal proposition is good lawyering. It is not clear
why we should think about its effects differently than using any other rhetorical
tools to persuade a judge as to the wisdom of one’s underlying case. The risk that a
judge is duped by clever lawyers is one the American adversarial model is
committed to tolerating.169
The second problem is less familiar. Could a Supreme Court Justice agree
with every jot and tittle of Part I of this Essay and still take as given and write
constitutional opinions under the assumption that substantive due process is a
contradiction in terms?
On one hand, judges act analogously all the time. Primus’s continuity
tenders demonstrate that judicial decisionmakers often write things in opinions that
they know not to be correct in a narrow sense. Charles Black memorably defended
Justice Black’s insistence on First Amendment absolutism on the ground (never
publicly espoused by the Justice)170 that this is the right “attitude” to take towards
the Bill of Rights even as one fully appreciates the logical necessity of balancing.171
Bickel, of course, was the most famous proponent of the Court’s disingenuous
invocation of procedural barriers to substantive review—in the name of principle,
no less!172 Constitutional adjudicators must respect other values in addition to and
potentially in tension with the analytic integrity of particular propositions of
168
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constitutional law. Common law constitutionalism indeed presupposes that
constitutional truth is constructed out of materials whose value flows from features,
such as antiquity or reliance,173 that are orthogonal to their “correctness.” One of
those features is and should be the power to persuade.
On the other hand, that concession seems to condone judicial dishonesty.
Normally lying is a moral bad,174 and it would be surprising if judges were held to
lower standards than others in this domain. Indeed, in his blunt assessment of
lawyering work as essentially involving lying and cheating, Daniel Markovits holds
out the judicial function as commendably distinct.175 David Shapiro has urged that
judicial candor is inherent in the obligation, crucial to the legitimacy of judging, to
give reasons: “In a sense, candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse
of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and
precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing about them and to
say another.”176 Micah Schwartzman writes that an adjudicator who brings the
violence of the state to bear upon a real-world dispute owes a moral duty to the
litigants to give an honest assessments of his or her reasons for action.177
Scholars who defend judicial dishonesty sometimes argue that the rule of
law requires decisions reached on policy or intuitive grounds nonetheless to be
articulated through legal technicalities.178 The apparent reliance on technicalities
gives a judicial opinion the appearance of law and can conceal political motivations.
But at other times such references can have a nearly opposite effect, suggesting a
lack of judicial empathy or an inability to appreciate the stakes of a decision. The
occasional imperative for the Supreme Court especially to communicate in nontechnical language might be one of the legacies of Brown v. Board of Education.179
Brown’s outsized significance surely results in part from an appeal to constitutional
common sense, validated over time, as a strategy for defeating legalistic but myopic
arguments based on text, history, and precedent.180
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Any tension between the technical accuracy of a constitutional opinion and
its public intelligibility undermines the case that judicial candor advances public
understanding. The degree of identity between judicial and public understanding is
an empirical question, and it seems obvious that perfect identity is not the answer.
That fact, if true, is not quite fatal for someone like Schwartzman, who adopts a
deontological stance towards the obligation of judicial sincerity.181 Note, though,
that constitutional law at the Supreme Court level is self-consciously not
deontological in respect to the litigants. The Court’s standards for certiorari
disclaim any interest in “error-correction,” instead searching for cases that may be
used as “vehicles” to announce broader rules, standards, and principles for the
benefit of society more generally.182 The Court, in other words, understands its job
to treat litigants as means rather than as ends in themselves.183
I want to suggest that judicial rhetoric in constitutional cases should best be
understood as emerging from an act of translation. Producing a judicial opinion
involves multiple decision nodes. A judge reaches a legal conclusion through some
mental process, the particulars of which are (it is important to say) irrelevant for
our purposes. Communicating that decision to an audience of colleagues, litigants,
lawyers, and the public involves a new set of choices. If the decision was reached
by intuition (and in the unlikely event the judge is aware that it was),184 the judge
must decide whether to reveal that fact or instead to write an opinion that uses the
tools of law to validate the hunch. If the judge reached the decision through the
very application of such tools (that is, if the judge perceives herself to have done
so), the judge still must decide whether and how to use those tools in writing the
opinion. Persuasion makes powerful demands at this stage, and a conscientious
judge should be aware that what persuades him or her might not persuade others.
The judge must communicate his or her ideas in a distinctive register—the
language, if you will, of constitutional rhetoric.

181

See Schwartzman, supra note 177, at 990.
See SUP CT. R. 10 (“[A] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”); H.W.
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 234
(1991) (“Another commonly agreed upon criterion that renders a case uncertworthy is if it is a ‘bad
vehicle’ or has ‘bad facts.’).
183
See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (Mary Gregor trans.,
1997) (1785). Something of the Court’s distinctive role in announcing broader societal
commitments lies behind Guido Calabresi’s view that “[t]he Supreme Court must occasionally lie;
the courts by and large should not.” CALABRESI, supra note 170, at 179.
184
See, e.g., Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal
Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977) (examining our inability to discern the
reasons behind our thoughts and actions).
182

32

Interpretive discourse has seen translation metaphors before, and it is
important to distinguish other uses.185 Lawrence Lessig has argued that fidelity to
the Constitution requires a form of translation, a sensitivity both to an unchanging
text and a changing context that can legitimate interpretive outcomes that differ
from what originalism might superficially seem to require.186 Lessig’s insight is to
more fully appreciate time as a dimension of difference in textual meaning. Lessig’s
claim is consistent with the notion that constitutional language such as “due process
of law” lacks the stability to make much sense of treating substantive due process
as an inherent contradiction in terms. But like most constitutional theorists who
have referenced translation, Lessig is concerned with the meanings a decisionmaker
attaches to a text he or she is charged with interpreting. My concern, instead, is with
the way in which the decisionmaker communicates that interpretive decision to his
or her audience.
James Boyd White’s usage is closer to mine, though his project has a
different normative center. For White, the metaphor of translation captures the idea
that someone who writes a legal opinion performs a creative act that does not
(because it cannot) simply reproduce the original text but rather is faithful both to
it and to the reader of the translation; it is “a way of establishing relations by
reciprocal gesture.”187 A translation “will be judged by its coherence, by the kinds
of fidelity it establishes with the original, and by the ethical and cultural meaning
it performs as a gesture of its own.”188 Like a good translation, the lawgiver should
be humble about his or her capacity for complete exposition and should understand
the ways in which the reader’s understandings bind the law’s public expression (and
therefore the law itself).189
A constitutional meme is a conventional form of public expression of
constitutional law. It is not a legal fiction because its falsity is not generally
acknowledged or even realized, either by author or by reader. 190 But the metaphor
of translation helps us to understand why a constitutional meme is not, then, a lie—
even if its falsity is known by the author alone.191 As an undergraduate I took a
course whose professor was a native French speaker. This professor had a habit of
referring to a prospective meeting with a student as a rendezvous. Among French
185
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speakers, this usage is entirely unremarkable, as the word is best translated into
English as “meeting.”192 Among American students, it was embarrassingly off-key,
since in American culture the word commonly connotes a meeting for the specific
purpose of a liaison. When this alternative meaning was (gingerly) brought to the
professor’s attention, he began to say “meeting,” even though rendezvous came
more naturally to his mind. We would never say the professor was lying or even
that he was being less than candid, even though he was not speaking his mind and
even though the word he initially used “technically” meant exactly what he
intended to convey. We would say instead that he was translating.
Now consider a judge who disagrees with the Court’s decision in
Obergefell. It does not matter for our purposes what grounds this disagreement,
whether a view that there is not sufficient consensus for the Court to mandate
marriage equality through the Constitution,193 that the generation that ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to extend to regulation of marriage in
this way,194 that extending marriage to same-sex couples threatens religious
liberty,195 or that same-sex relationships are immoral or may validly be treated as
such by the state.196 Should this hypothetical dissenting judge’s further argument
that substantive due process “distorts the constitutional text”197 depend on whether
he or she agrees that it is a textual contradiction? I think not, just as advancing the
argument that the Obergefell Court has repeated the errors of Dred Scott198 should
not depend on whether the judge believes Dred Scott was erroneous. If it has
become a conventional view of the law-consuming public (including members of
the legal profession and other professional elites who form the core of the judge’s
audience) that substantive due process is a textual distortion and that Dred Scott
was wrong, then those propositions are part of our constitutional law and are
therefore resources for use in constitutional argument. The judge who avails herself
of those resources in the course of adjudicative exposition engages in an act of
translation.
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Hold the rotten eggs and tomatoes until an important objection is addressed.
My French-speaking professor began to use “meeting” rather than rendezvous
because he was trying earnestly to articulate his intended meaning to his students.
He was not trying to communicate something that he did not believe, and he was
not trying to persuade his students of anything. The usage of constitutional memes
that I am offering shares the first feature by hypothesis. In the Obergefell
hypothetical, the judge is trying to communicate a proposition of constitutional law
that the judge sincerely believes: the Constitution does not require state recognition
of same-sex marriage. The language in which he is doing so has no abstract
meaning (as rendezvous has no abstract meaning); it has an acquired constitutional
meaning that it is rhetorically useful for the judge to invoke. In so doing the judge
is engaging the reader as a participant in exposition, as any good translator does.199
And as constitutional law requires. The line of division between
communication and persuasion is one the epistemology of constitutional law does
not recognize. It is widely agreed among constitutional scholars that propositions
of constitutional law acquire their permanence through public acceptance.200 As
Richard Fallon writes, “the legal legitimacy of the Constitution depends much more
on its present sociological acceptance (and thus its sociological legitimacy) than
upon the (questionable) legality of its formal ratification. Other fundamental
elements of the constitutional order, including practices of constitutional
interpretation, also owe their legal legitimacy to current sociological
acceptance.”201 If this is true, then successful rhetoric is a legal obligation of a
constitutional judge.202
Conclusion
Constitutional memes are entrenched—indeed, are self-reinforcing—but
they are not permanent. It was once hornbook law that rights could be divided into
distinct civil, political, or social rights.203 We no longer think of rights in those
terms, and the categories were overlapping and internally inconsistent even during
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Reconstruction, the heyday of the tripartite scheme.204 This change in legal
understanding did not occur because of an intervening constitutional amendment,
Supreme Court decision, or other change in substantive constitutional law. What
changed was the conventional public expression of rights, as the language of rights
increasingly came to represent an aspiration towards universal moral equality.
Substantive due process might not always be though incompatible with the
constitutional text, and indeed this Essay can be understood, in part, as a step
towards that end.
That said, the Essay is itself a paradox. It seeks to expose fallacies in the
textual argument against substantive due process but it is neither a defense of
substantive due process as a constitutional doctrine nor even a criticism of the
textual argument. The way to square this circle is to understand the Essay as a kind
of defense of fallacies. Constructing and relying upon constitutional memes that
serve one’s rhetorical purposes is part of what it means to advance arguments in the
real world that constitutional law regulates. Scholars can and should deconstruct
old ideas, but judges may be forgiven if they haven’t the time.
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